Indeed, a host of factors has gone into the making of Pakistan. Of prime significance among them were: a fortuitous configuration of forces and events (both natinal and international), the myopic policies of the Indian National Congress, the adroit leadership of Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah, and the massive response his appeal for Pakistan elicited from the Muslim masses across the length and breadth of Indian subcontinent.
However, as I have argued in Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah (1981), by far the most critical variable was Jinnah himself. Of course, the “response” factor was also crucial for the simple reason that without that measure of response, there would have been no Pakistan; but, then, the response itself was the handiwork of Jinnah, since he alone, and no one else, could have elicited that response.
And that response did not come easily, much less simultaneously or uniform from various regions in the subcontinent. Moreover, Jinnah had to labour long and hard; he had to build up unity in Muslims’ disparate ranks, step by step; he had to work assiduously for nine long years before he could prepare Muslim India politically, psychologically, and otherwise to a point that it returned an overwhelming verdict in favour of Pakistan during the general elections of 1945-46.
The present article concerns the respective roles of the Muslim majority and minority provinces in building up the final response, the differential in their respective responses at various stages, and their criticality in the final denouement.
The instrument through which the Muslim response to Pakistan was articulated and built up was the All India Muslim League (AIML). The AIML, founded in 1906, gathered strength and momentum within a decade, went into eclipse during the tumultuous, emotion-laden Khalifat movement (1920-23), was revived by Jinnah with the assistance of Fazl-i-Hussain in 1924, became divided into Jinnah and Shafi Leagues over the Muslim response to Simon Commission in 1927, and later into Aziz and Hedayat factions (1933), and was finally re-united under Jinnah’s leadership in 1934. The united Muslim League held its first session in Bombay in April 1936, where it formulated its programme and decided for the first time in its annals to contest (provincial) elections, scheduled for early 1937. Despite the lack of an organizational network, of finances, and of an organ to back up its cause and candidates, the Muslim League yet secured 112 (about 23 percent) out of 491 Muslim seats. Its performance was comparatively better in the Muslim minority provinces, but poor in the Muslim majority ones, except in Bengal where it emerged as the single largest party. However, having won the largest number of Muslim seats on an all-India basis, it emerged as the only Muslim party on an all-India plane. Moreover, it could lay claim to the pan-Indian Muslim constituency.
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